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STRICT LIABILITY AND THE FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS ACT'
Recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) upon that
basis of liability loosely designated in the law of torts as 'liability
without faulf' 2 has been denied by most of the cases which have con-
sidered the problem. The pertinent section of the Act states that the
government shall be liable
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee
of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or em-
ployment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law
of the place where the act or omission occurred.3 (Emphasis sup-
plied)
Before discussing the cases in which it has been contended that the
government is subject to strict liability and the legislative history be-
hind the Act, it is first necessary to examine the nature and scope of
the doctrine of strict liability at common law.
The basic notion behind the doctrine is that one may, under certain
circumstances, be legally responsible for consequences of his acts re-
gardless of his intent or the degree of care he exercises. Tort theory
has evolved from an early common law position of liability without
fault in all cases through a subsequent period where it was stated
there was no liability without fault in any case, to the present day
position of liability without fault in some cases. 4
Although strict liability is solidly entrenched in the law today, the
types of cases which will invoke its application cannot be stated with
mathematical nicety, as there are various ways of grouping the some-
what overlapping categories which have traditionally warranted appli-
cation of the rule.5 The various courts which have dealt with the ques-
tion of strict liability under the Act have been faced, in the main, with
four situations, each of which usually called for application of liability
without fault at common law: (1) trespass, (2) fire, (3) abnormal
things and activities, and (4) aircraft. These historic categories will
serve as the framework for this discussion.
A tracing of the history of the rule of strict liability under the FTCA
reveals two distinct states of development-one before the celebrated
'28 U.S.C. 1846 (b), 1402, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-78, 2680 (1946).
2 For a general discussion of the rule, see Prosser, Torts sec. 56-61 (2d ed.
1955).
3 Supra note 1 at 1846 (b).
4 Supra note 2 at 315-17.
5 Id. see. 56-59.
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case of Dalehite v. United States O and the other after it. Three of the
four cases discussing the question in the first stage of its development
accepted the theory of strict liability under the Act; the fourth rejected
it.
The first case, Boyce v. United States,7 presented the most accepted
of all strict liability categories, blasting. This "extrahazardous activity"
falls within category three above and usually results in strict liability,
even in those jurisdictions which reject the broader implications of the
rule of "abnormal things and activities." The court stated that the
plaintiffs established causation and that
in the absence, therefore, of the application of... (the discretionary
function section of the Act)8 . . . a recovery in some amount would
of necessity have followed in each case, since it is fundamental that
under the substantive law of Iowa dynamite is a dangerous instru-
mentality, the use of which, so as to damage the property of another,
constitutes a 'wrongful act' for which recovery may be had, even
without a specific charge of negligence or the proof thereof. 9
The Court ruled for the defendant on the discretionary function ex-
ception.
Another illustration of the judicial thinking on this question prior
to the Dalehite case is ParcelU v. United States.10 The plaintiff sued for
damages to his property resulting from the crash thereon of two United
States Air Force planes. The court rendered judgment for the plaintiff,
saying that the government had not rebutted the inference of negli-
gence raised by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur," and even if it had,
there would be absolute liability without fault for such an activity at
common law. In answering the defendant's contention that the rule of
strict liability was not applicable under the Act, the court said:
The words 'wrongful act' in that portion of the statute must be given
some meaning. To say that 'wrongful act' is a tautological phrase
meaning negligence is inconsistent with the general rule of statutory
interpretation, namely, that no portion of a statute susceptible of
meaning is to be treated as superfluous.' 2 In 45 Words and Phrases
627, many cases are cited in which the phrase 'wrongful act' has been
G346 U.S. 15 (1953).
7 93 F. Supp. 866 (SD Iowa 1950).8 The "discretionary function" exception of the Act relieves the govern-
ment of any liability when the negligence complained of is committed on the
"planning" in contradistinction to the 'operational" level.
9 Supra note 7 at 868.
10 104 F. Supp. 110 (SD W. Va. 1951).
11 For the reader who is wondering why the court is deciding whether the
presumption of negligence raised by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been
rebutted, usually a question of fact within the province of the jury, it is pointed
out that suits under the FTCA are tried without a jury. 28 U.S.C. 2402 (1946).
12 Supra note 10 at 116, citing Hurley & Comi v. United States, 192 F. 2d 297
(CA4 1951).
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interpreted to mean any act which in the ordinary course of events
infringes on the rights of another to his damage. To say that a tort
giving rise to absolute liability is not a 'wrongful act' would be a
technical refinement of language incompatible with that liberal in-
terpretation of the sovereign's waiver of immunity which the highest
court in the land has admonished us to employ.13
Whether aviation is treated as an "extrahazardous activity" or classi-
fied as a "trespass", there is ample authority that strict liability ensues
for ground damage caused by airplanes. 14
The third case litigating the question of whether the government
can be subjected to strict liability under the FTCA arose, again, out
of the crash of a government airplane on private property.'5 The ap-
pellate court affirmed the judgment of the lower court for the plaintiff
and on the point of absolute liability said:
The flying of an airplane below safe altitude immediately
adjacent to the property of the plaintiffs, ensuing crash and resultant
injuries sustained by the plaintiffs would entitle the plaintiffs to dam-
ages under the law of Colorado, and where the airplane involved was
piloted by an officer of the United States Air Force acting within the
scope of his employment, there was a redressible wrong in the nature
of trespass for which the United States would be similarly liable
under the FTCA.16 (Emphasis supplied)
The only dissenting note was interjected by the opinion in United
States v. Hull where it was said, by way of dictum:
[I]n certain cases, under local law a private person may be liable
without fault for injuries deemed 'ultra-hazardous', but the United
States would not be subject to suit on such a liability for under 28
U.S.C. 1346 (b), the United States has consented to be sued only
where the injury was 'caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission' of some government employee acting within the scope of
his office.17
In evaluating the opinion of this court on the question of strict liability,
it is suggested that two facts should be taken into account: (1) the
court never actually came to grips with the real problem, i.e., what is
the meaning of the "wrongful ace' phrase of the Act, and (2) the case
does not present an orthodox strict liability situation since plaintiff was
suing for injuries she sustained when a United States Post Office
counter window fell on her hand as she was sliding money under it.
The turning point in the judicial trend toward the acceptance of
13 Supra note 10 at 116, citing United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
338 U.S. 366 (1949); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1950).
14Restatement of Torts, sec. 520, Comment b (1939), (extra hazardous
activity). United States v. Gaidys, 194 F. 2d 762 (CA10 1952), (trespass).
15 U.S. v. Gaidys, supra 14.36 Id. at 765.
17 195 F. 2d 64 (CA1 1952).
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strict liability under the Act came in the famous case of Dalehite v.
United States.18 This suit was the consolidation of many causes of
action brought against the United States under the FTCA to recover
damages for injuries to persons and property resulting from the dis-
astrous explosion at Texas City, Texas, of ammonium nitrate fertilizer
produced according to specifications and under the control of the
United States for export to increase food supply in areas under military
occupation following World War II. The trial court found the govern-
ment negligent and entered judgment for the plaintiff. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. A four to three Court held the government
not liable, basing its decision on the "discretionary function exception"
to the Act, but then went on to make a statement, not essential to the
decision of the case, that Congress didn't intend to make the United
States liable without fault in those situations where a private person
would be so liable. It is submitted that the same criticism leveled
against the court in the Hull case might validly be aimed at the
Supreme Court's dictum on absolute liability here. The conclusion of
the court seems to be a mere begging of the question of legislative in-
tent behind the liability section of the Act, contrary to a reasonable,
objective interpretation of the section and without any reference to a
source wherein such an intention can be seen.19
Of the nine cases discussing strict liability after Dalehite, four are
of the Rylands v. Fletcher type, two involve fire, and three are airplane
accidents. Only one of the nine accepts a theory of strict liability.
Less than a month after Dalehite, a court which earlier had com-
mitted itself to the position that absolute liability exists for damage
caused by government airplanes20 stated, again by way of dictum,-"
that the government was not absolutely liable without fault for the
destruction of crops of private landowners caused by government
spraying of its own property, adjacent to that of plaintiffs', with a
destructive herbicide.22
The spraying of a destructive herbicide near crops should, it would
Is Supra note 6.
19 Another curious fact about this litigation is that after this *udgment, Con-
gress took it upon itself to pass special relief bills to reimburse fully the claimants
in this action in an amount in excess of two hundred million dollars, a chore, the
avoidance of which was the admitted purpose of Congress in drafting the FTCA.
Most interesting is the language used by both legislative chambers in awarding
compensation to the claimants, characterizing the fertilizer as "an inherently
dangerous and hazardous explosive .. " H.R. Rep. 2024, 83rd Cong. 2d Sess. 9
(1954); S. Rep. 684, 84th Cong. 1st Sess. 19 (1955).
20 Gaidys case, supra note 15.
2 1 This case turned on the "discretionary function" exception.22 Harris et al. v. United States, 205 F. 2d 765 (CA10 1953).
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seem, be classified as an "abnormal activity", category three of the
strict liability analysis above. That type of strict liability may be traced
to the controversial English case of Rylands v. Fletcher,23 where the
defendant was subjected to strict liability for damage caused by the
escape of water collected on his land which was deemed to be "ab-
normal and inappropriate" in light of the locale. The doctrine has
subsequently been applied either where the doing of an act or the
possession of a thing involves a high degree of risk to others, unreason-
able in light of the surroundings. Whether this court would, in the
future, reject all types of absolute liability under the Act or only the
Rylands v. Fletcher type is not made clear by the opinion.
The case of Danner v. United States24 was an action by land-
owners against the government for damage to realty caused by flood-
waters of the Missouri river and allegedly due to the defendant's negli-
gent failure to maintain the approach fill. The problem was resolved
once again with reference to the "discretionary function" section of the
Act, but the court echoed the antipathy to strict liability seen in the
Dalehite case.25
A decision unquestionably attributable to the Dalehite dictum is
Ure v. United States.26 The plaintiffs sued the government to recover
for the flooding of land following a break in an irrigation supply canal
operated by the United States Reclamation Service. The district court
decided for the plaintiffs,21 stating that the doctrine of Rylands v.
Fletcher applied. The appellate court reversed the judgment, pointing
out that the case was decided below on grounds of strict liability be-
fore the Dalehite case rendered that basis of recovery inapplicable
under the Act.
Porter v. United States28 applied the Dalehite rule that the govern-
ment cannot be subjected to strict liability in a case involving explo-
sives. A father and his minor son sued for personal injuries sustained
by the son due to the explosion of a military fuse which the youth
found in a field between his home and the United States Army post
23 L.R. 1 Exch. 265 (1866). One author notes that although many American
jurisdictions purportedly reject Rylands v. Fletcher, "there is in fact no case
applying Rylands v. Fletcher which is not duplicated in all essential respects by
some American decision which proceeds on the theory of nuisance; and it is quite.
evident that under that name the principle is in reality universally accepted."
Supra note 2 at 337, 338.24 114 F. Supp. 477 (WD Mo. 1953).
25 It is not certain whether the fact situation of this case would give rise to
strict liability against a private person at common law. The "unnatural" state of
the river due to the improvements thereon for control might bring the case within
the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher.
26 225 F. 2d 709 (CA9 1955).
27 93 F. Supp. 779 (DC Ore. 1950).
28 228 F. 2d 389 (CA4 1955).
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of Ft. Jackson. The appellate court affirmed the judgment for the
defendant handed down in the lower court:
[S]ince the decision by the Supreme Court in the case of Dalehite v.
United States, there can be no assumption that the government is
liable under the FTCA merely because it may be the owner of an
'inherently dangerous commodity' or engaged in an 'extra-hazardous
activity'.29
The Dalehite dictum was extended to another type of activity in
Strangi v. United States.30 The United States was having land cleared
for a dam and reservoir by burning the timber thereon when the flames
spread to and damaged adjacent tracts of privately-owned land. The
court held for the defendant by concluding that the actor was an in-
dependent contractor,3 1 but also reiterated Dalehite on strict liability.
At a very early date, the common law appreciated the dangerous
potentialities of fire and imposed, with some limitations, strict liability
for its consequences. Although the extent of these limitations has been
and still is disputed, it is well settled that strict liability ensued when
the fire was intentionally set,32 as it was here.
A forest fire which spread from United States forest lands and
damaged private property in the state of Washington gave rise to the
case of Rayonier, Inc. v. United States. 33 The plaintiff predicated his
action upon two theories of recovery: (1) the government is liable
under a state statute imposing liability without fault on a private land-
owner for failing to take steps to remedy substandard conditions on his
property, and (2) the government is liable for damages sustained by
reason of the United States Forest Service's negligence in fighting a
forest fire since, under Washington law, a private person or a corpora-
tion would be liable for negligence under similar circumstances. The
court disposed of both contentions with reference to the familiar Dale-
hite case. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and although the
29 Although this decision against strict liability was rendered by the same
court (CA4) that decided in favor of strict liability in the Praylou case, infra note
41, several factors point to the conclusion that this court has not totally rejected strict
liability under the Act: (1) the type of strict liability urged upon the court here
is not as well accepted generally as some other types, (2) the Supreme Court had
already spoken out against this type (Dalehite) and (3) the element of strong
state policy evidenced by a statute imposing strict liability on the particular
activity, present in the Praylou case, was lacking here.
30211 F. 2d 305 (CA5 1954).
31 The requisite master-servant relationship lacking, the goverment cannot be
liable since the whole Act is premised on the theory of 'respondeat superior".
Hubsch v. United States, Schweitzer v. United States, 174 F. 2d 7 (1949).3 2 Supra note 4 at 327. In those jurisdictions which accept Rylands v.
Fletcher, there is also the possibility of absolute liability on the theory that fire is
an "extrahazardous activity" when set near timber and if it escapes, the actor is
strictly liable for resultant damages.
33 225 F. 2d 642 (CA9 1955).
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decision did not turn on strict liability, the opinion appears to mark a
.distinctly different philosophic approach to the Act from that seen in,
and generally since, Dalehite.34
There have been three cases involving government aircraft since
Dalehite. The trial court in Dahlstrom v. United Statess stated that
there is persuasive authority to the effect that where the law of the
state where the accident occurred makes the injurious flight of aircraft
a trespass and therefore imposes liability even in the absence of negli-
gence, then that flight is 'wrongful' within the meaning of the
FTCA .... 386 (Emphasis supplied)
but held for the government on the "discretionary function" exception.
The appellate court reversed both findings, said this wasn't a "dis-
cretionary function", and remanded the cause to the District Court to
be dismissed unless there was a showing of negligence.3 7 Probably the
most arresting aspect of this litigation is the lower court's concept of
.misfeasance":
Although there [in Dalehite] the Supreme Court held that the Act
would not impose liability upon the United States merely by virtue
of the fact that the manufacturing and packing of fertilizer made with
ammonius nitrate was an 'extra-hazardous' activity, it did not limit
the operation of the Act to cases involving negligence.38
United States v. Taylor, 3 although it resulted in a judgment for the
defendant, cannot be said to reject strict liability under the Act. The
cause of the action was, once again, the crash of a government airplane
on private property. The court held that the government was not
liable under a state statute imposing liability without fault on the
owners of aircraft for all damages resulting from their operation, since
the agents here were not "acting within the scope of their employ-
ment."
40
3477 S. Ct. 374 (1957). Particularly interesting is one bit of language used
by the Court here: ". . . the very purpose of the Tort Claims Act was to waive the
governments traditional all-encompassing immunity from tort actions and to
establish 'novel and unprecedented governmental liability'." Cf. Dalehite v. United
States, supra, for diametrically opposed language.
5 129 F. Supp. 772 (DC Minn. 1955).3 6 Citing Gaidys, Praylou, and Parcell cases, supra.
37228 F. 2d 819 (CA8 1956).
38 129 F. Supp. 772, at 774 (1955). For other non-restrictive interpretations
of "misfeasance" see 27 Words & Phrases 339: 'misfeasance' is the improper per-
formance of some act which might lawfully be done." See also Ballentine's Law
Dictionary to the same effect. It is submitted that the word is, in reality, a non-
restrictive, legal conclusion of liability, not attempting to establish when an act is
"improper", but rather, reserving that task for the orthodox principles of the law
of torts, which does not limit the use of the word to negligence.
39236 F. 2d 649 (CA6 1956).
4028 U.S.C. 1346 (b) (1946): . . . negligent or wrongful act or omission
of any employee of the government while acting within the scope of his ofce or
employment...." At the time of the crash the pilot was about two hundred miles
from his prescribed training area, engaged in prankish maneuvers over his home
town.
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The only case after Dalehite that can be cited with certainty in
support of the position that strict liability is not excluded by the Act
is United States v. Praylou.41 In holding that the government was
strictly liable to the plaintiffs, the court pointed out that South Carolina,
the state in which the accident occurred, had adopted the Uniform
Aeronautics Act which, inter alia, imposes absolute liability without
fault on the operators of aircraft for all damages resulting from such
operation:
To hold that in those states [which have adopted the Uniform Aero-
nautics Act] the government would be liable on a showing of negli-
gence whereas private individuals are held to absolute liability by
the statute would be contrary to the requirement of the FTCA.42
It is submitted that this court determined the true rule to be that if
the particular local law to be applied imposes absolute liability on
private individuals for a certain activity, then the United States is sub-
ject to a like imposition. The Supreme Court denied certiorari.43
It is immediately apparent from an examination of the leading
cases dealing with strict liability under the Act, that the problem has
not been adequately probed, either from a policy standpoint or from
the standpoint of orthodox statutory interpretation. An investigation
of the legislative materials bearing on the Act might shed some light
on the question of whether the national legislature "intended" the gov-
ernment to be subject to strict liability in the same manner as a private
individual.
A reading of the debate on the floor of the seventy-ninth Con-
gress regarding the adoption of the Congressional Reorganization Act
of 1946, of which the FTCA was a part, reveals no hint of legislative
intent on the point in question.44
The author of a critical note on the Praylou case45 refers to a report
of the House of Representatives wherein is seen, he maintains, legisla-
tive intent to preclude the operation of strict liability under the Act.
The report states:
Section 402 specifies the claims which wouldn't be covered by the
bill. The first subsection of section 402 exempts from the bill claims
41208 F. 2d 291 (CA4 1953).
42 Id. at 295. See 28 U.S.C. 1346 (1946): . . . under circumstances where
the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."
43347 U.S. 934 (1954); see note, 24 Tenn. L.R. 301 at 320 (1956) where it
is said: "Despite the apparently unmistakable pronouncement of the Supreme
Court in Dalehite that the Act does 'not extend to liability without fault' the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals narrowed the implications of the high courts
opinion by affirming government liability based upon a state statute imposing
absolute liability on the owner of aircraft for injuries caused by their operation."
44 Congressional Record, 79th Cong. (1945).
45 23 Geo. Wash. L.R. 106 (1954).
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based upon the performance or nonperformance of discretionary
functions or duties on the part of a Federal agency or government
employee, whether or not the discretion involved be abused, and
claims based upon the act or omission of a government employee
exercising due care in the execution of a statute oi regulation, whether
or not valid.46 (Emphasis supplied)
Does this report wholly exclude strict liability under the Act? Or
does it do so only in those instances when the actor is executing a
statute or regulation?47
In the absence of a direct expression of Congressional intention the
search must be extended to indirect sources. The proceedings of the
Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate show that the
committee, in handling the tremendous volume of private relief bills
referred to it annually, has attempted to establish something of a legis-
lative stare decisis system by indexing the cases according to kind for
purposes of future reference. Interesting for present purposes are two
claims for private relief which the committee catalogued as "liability
without fault" situations. Both of these petitions for redress were
given Congressional consideration subsequent to the enactment of the
FTCA, but in the reports of the bills the committee attributed the
right to Congressional consideration to the fact that "these claimants
have no remedy under the FTCA ... for the reason that the accidents
out of which their claims arose occurred prior to January 1, 1945, the
effective date of the FTCA."48 (Emphasis supplied)
In light of the facts: (1) that both of these accidents were caused
by government airplanes; (2) that there were no allegations of negli-
gence in either instance; and (3) Congress was of the opinion that if
the mishaps had occurred after the effective date of the Act, the
claimants would have been afforded a judicial remedy, it might well
be contended that the existence of strict liability as a basis of recovery
under the Act was contemplated by its enactors.
The question did not break upon the judicial scene totally unfor-
seen. In an article published only a few months after the passage of
the Act, the potential difficulty centering around the "negligent or
wrongful" correlative was detected:
Does the fact that the state statute or state decisional law
gives the injured party a legal cause of action against a private person
engaged in such activities (i.e., extrahazardous) mean that there has
been such a legal wrong as is within the scope of the 'wrongful act
or omission' language of the Federal Tort Claims Act. If it was the
46 H.R. Rep. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 6: 10936 of H.R. Rep. (1945).
4 7 In which case the government is already immune since such an action is
clearly a "discretionary function."
48 Sen. Judiciary Committee Reports 49 & 66, 82d Cong.
NoTxs
intention of Congress to give the injured person a remedy against the
government when he would have a remedy against a private person,
it may well be argued that recovery should be allowed under the Act
especially since such cases are not specifically mentioned in Section
421 which excepts certain torts .... 49
Can it be seriously contended that the actual language of the Act
excludes the notion of strict liability? Is it not significant that previous
piecemeal governmental liability legislation covering particular agen-
cies like the Armed Forces, and the Coast and Geodetic Survey spoke
only in terms of "negligence" and avoided the "wrongful act" type of
language seen in the broad waiver of immunity under the FTCA?50
If it was the intention of Congress to exclude strict liability from the
coverage of the Act, why was it not included in the host of specific
exemptions seen in Section 421? Can it safely be said that the position
of the Dalehite case on liability without fault under the Act is "unchal-
lenged", or "solidly based upon the statute?"51 Fair, objective answers
to these questions would seem to suggest that none of the orthodox
legal indicia militate against the adoption, under the Act, of the rule
of strict liability, in the proper case.
Fundamentally, however, the problem is one of a social, rather
than a strictly legal, nature. Is society best subserved in using the
common law concept of "fault" as a measuring rod of governmental
responsibility, or should the test be predicated upon the economic fact
that a government is the best of all possible risk spreaders and that
perhaps the taxpaying public should ordinarily bear the losses resulting
from governmental activity?52
Conclusion
The applicability of strict liability as a basis of recovery under the
FTCA today involves, as does any question of law, a prediction based
upon past indications of judicial thought. The author is of the opinion
that this particular prediction depends mainly on the Dalehite case-
its interpretation and its vitality. Although Dalehite purports to reject
all strict liability, and admittedly has had a substantial effect on sub-
sequent cases, it is doubtful whether it was ever precedent for any-
thing beyond the proposition that the government is not absolutely
49 Baer, Suing Uncle Sam in Tort, 26 N.C.L.R. 119, at 123 (1947).50 Supra note 46.
51 Davis, Tort-Liability of Governmental Units, 40 Minn. L.R. 751 (1956) at
791, fn. 194: "The Courts holdin, to this effect in Dalehite is unchallenged and
seems solidly based on the statute.'
52 This premise is the foundation of the systems of sovereign responsibility in
some of the continental countries. Schwartz, Public Tort Liability in France, 29
N.Y.U.L.R. 1432 at 1444 (1954).
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liable for damages resulting from "possession of an inherently danger-
ous commodity"--and was only dictum even as to thatl
Even more questionable is its vitality in light of the recent Rayonier
case.53 It is believed that the substantial change in personnel on the
Supreme Court in the short period separating Dalehite and Rayonier
may be responsible for the pronounced difference in basic approach to
the Act seen in the latter case.
It is hoped that the Supreme Court will, in a properly presented
case, consider the problem de novo, bearing in mind the manifest
Congressional purpose in passing the Act. 4 As Mr. Justice Jackson
said, the Act surely was intended to embrace more serious contro-
versies than traffic accidents; if we continue to construe it with such
rigidity, we will only have changed the ancient maxim that "the
King can do no wrong" to "the King can do only little wrongs."55
Robert C. Cetrulo
53 Supra note 34.54 Supra note 19.
55 Supra note 6 at 60.
